Introduction
On December 1, 2010, the Federal Reserve (Fed) released previously confidential information about its special emergency programs during the financial crisis, as required by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The Fed's disclosures included the names of the financial institutions and foreign central banks that received financial assistance from the Fed during the crisis, the amounts borrowed, the dates credits were extended, the interest rates charged, information about collateral, and a description and rationale of the credit terms under each Federal Reserve emergency facility.
1 While the Dodd-Frank law did not require the release of these details for crisis lending through the Fed's regular discount window, the Fed was forced to disclose this information by court order on March 31, 2011, after running out of legal appeals to block publication. Perhaps most surprising is the huge sum that went to bail out foreign private banks and corporations including two European megabanks--Deutsche Bank and Credit Suisse--which were the largest beneficiaries of the Fed's purchase of mortgage-backed securities" (Sewall and McGinty 2010) . 3 Three months later, when the Fed released the details of its discount window lending under court order, Bloomberg News headlined with "Foreign Banks Tapped Fed's Secret Lifeline Most at Crisis Peak." Bloomberg reported that foreign banks accounted for "at least 70 percent of the $110.7 billion borrowed" at the discount window at the peak of the crisis in October 2008 (Keoun and Torres 2011) .
The Fed's disclosures were exogenous in the sense that Federal Reserve officials could not have known they would be required to reveal the transaction-specific details of their lending at the time they were making their emergency lending decisions. The Fed's policy had always been to keep these data confidential, on the grounds there is a stigma attached to borrowing from the Fed during a crisis. But the disclosure requirements came after the credit crisis had passed and were very likely unexpected. Bernie Sanders' amendment to the Dodd-Frank bill requiring the disclosures was introduced in Congress in May 2010, over a year after the Fed's emergency program lending peaked at more than $1 trillion in late-2008. 4 Likewise, lending through the in U.S. dollars to banks in foreign jurisdictions. 5 The second measure is a country's share of the Fed's total foreign lending from its six emergency facilities plus the discount window. Unlike the swap arrangements, the Fed had little discretion over where the money from these other facilities went, as most of it was distributed through auctions. Nevertheless, I find that the best predictor of the Fed's foreign lending by either measure is the exposure of large U.S. money-center banks 4 Sanders' disclosure amendment (S.AMDT.3738) was proposed on May 6, 2010 and approved by a vote of 98-0 on May 11, 2010.
5 The Fed had discretion over swap arrangements and some requests by foreign central banks were denied by the Fed.
to a foreign market (where "exposure" is measured as the share of the individual foreign market in the total consolidated foreign claims of U.S. money-center banks). This relationship is robust to economic and financial controls, which suggests that the Federal Reserve served as lender of last resort for the world's banking sector at least in part because it served the interests of the major U.S. banks.
The second way I use the disclosures follows from this finding. contributions from "global banks" (defined as U.S. and foreign-owned money-center banks with branches or agencies in the U.S.) significantly reduce the likelihood that a legislator will vote in favor of the bill. In addition, I find that ideologically right-wing representatives are substantially more likely than left-leaning representatives to support this legislation--an historic reversal of ideological positions on the Fed.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides background on the global crisis and a summary of the Fed's global lender-of-last-resort facilities. Section 3 introduces the data, models, and results of my analyses of the Fed's foreign operations. Section 4 moves to the congressional level and provides data, models, and results of my analysis of voting on the "Audit the Fed" bill. Section 5 concludes with implications for the future of the Fed's political independence.
The Federal Reserve's Global Lending during the Crisis
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 gave the Federal Reserve responsibility for both setting monetary policy and for maintaining the stability of financial markets. In the latter capacity, the Fed supervises U.S. and non-U.S. banks and bank holding companies that are members of the Federal Reserve System and provides lender-of-last-resort services to these institutions during financial crises. During the recent financial crisis, the Fed provided more than a trillion dollars in emergency loans to the financial sector to address the breakdown of interbank and other money markets and to avert the failure of individual firms of systemic-importance, like AIG.
According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), which conducted a one-time audit of the Fed's emergency operations under the authority of the Dodd-Frank law, "the scale and nature of this assistance amounted to an unprecedented expansion of the Federal Reserve System's traditional role as lender-of-last-resort" (United States GAO 2011, 1).
The programs were unprecedented partly because of their international scope. The largest program, measured in terms of the peak dollar amount of loans outstanding, was the dollar swap lines program (see Table 1 , reproduced from the GAO Report). 6 But other emergency programs, particularly the Term Auction Facility (TAF) and the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) were also tapped by foreign financial institutions. 7 In fact, U.S.
branches of foreign banks and U.S. subsidiaries of foreign institutions received more than half of the total dollar amount of TAF and CPFF loans made (see Table 2, Table 3 , and Figure 1 ).
Foreign banks were also heavy borrowers at the Fed's discount window during the crisis. Table   4 indicates that 15 of the 30 largest borrowers (measured by peak loan amount) at the discount window where branches or agencies of foreign banking organizations.
The proximate reason the Fed provided last-resort loans to non-U.S. banks was that foreign financial institutions experienced severe funding shortages in U.S. dollars after shortterm interbank markets froze up in October 2008. These dollar shortages were a direct outgrowth of the explosive growth of cross-border banking after 1999. 8 As depicted in Figure 2 , foreign banks, particularly European banks, began accumulating large amounts of dollardenominated assets, including Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS), via the shadow banking system. 9 Dollar-denominated assets of banks outside the U.S. peaked at over $10 trillion before the crisis, an amount equal to the total assets of the U.S. commercial banking sector (Shin 2012 Table   5) . At the peak, the temporary swap lines accounted for over 25 percent of the Fed's total assets (Fleming and Klagge 2010, 5) . By most accounts, the swaps were successful in channeling dollar liquidity abroad, signaling central bank cooperation, and calming markets (Goldberg, et al. 2010 , Baba et al. 2009 Fed established a dollar-euro swap arrangement with the ECB, but the ECB did not release the names or the nationalities of the banks that drew dollar credits under the swaps. 13 The weakness of this measure is that the Fed's policy was to auction emergency loans to any domestic or foreign bank that met the eligibility requirements, so the Fed had little control over where the loans went (United States GAO 2011). The same held for the discount window where foreign banks with branches in the U.S. could draw loans under the authority of U.S. law. 14 For all these programs, the impetus to draw credit from the Fed rested with the borrower.
I draw on the FOMC's swap line selection criteria to estimate the economic and financial covariates of the Fed's foreign lending during the crisis. I also consider a political economy covariate: the interests of large money-center banks. Previous research has shown that U.S.
money-center banks comprise a key constituency for international last-resort lenders such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the U.S. Treasury Department's Exchange Stabilization
Fund (Broz 2005 , Broz and Hawes 2006a , Broz and Hawes 2006b . This is because such lastresort lending ensures that the countries in which these banks are highly exposed are protected under the lender's insurance umbrella. 17 My argument is that U.S. money-center banks benefit when the Fed provides dollar liquidity to foreign countries in which they are highly exposed.
While it is not possible to observe money-center bank influence directly, we can assess the degree which the Fed's selection of swap lines correlates with their interests. (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . 19 The trade share variable is meant to capture the Fed's concern with supporting countries that are major U.S. trading partners. The inflation rate proxies for the Fed's concern with a central bank's "record of sound economic management." 20 Against expectations, the sign on this estimated effect of U.S. TRADE SHARE in Model 3 is negative, but it is not significant.
However, the estimated INFLATION coefficient is negative and significant, suggesting that the FOMC did considered "sound economic management" a criterion for selection. Overall, the results in Table 8 reveal a remarkably consistent pattern: foreign countries that received larger shares of the Fed's total peak emergency lending were countries in which U.S. money-center banks held larger claims on banks and corporations. In other words, the exposure of U.S. banks to a foreign country correlates strongly and positively with crisis lending by the Federal Reserve. Since this lending was allocated mostly by auctions, the Fed did not explicitly choose which banks and which countries to support. This suggests that foreign banks that tapped the Fed for dollar liquidity have connections via branches and counterparty relationships that overlap closely with the foreign lending exposures and interests of U.S.
money-center banks.
Correlates of Congressional Voting to Increase the Fed's Transparency
Immediately following the Federal Reserve's court-ordered disclosure of the names and nationalities of the banks that had borrowed from the Fed, Ron Paul began plans for congressional hearings: "I am surprised and deeply disturbed to learn the staggering amount of money that went to foreign banks. These lending activities provided no benefit to American taxpayers, the American economy, or even directly to American banks" (Felsenthal and On the other hand, the Fed's stimulus that followed the bust dramatically reduced the return on retirees' savings, as interest rates have been stuck close to zero for several years. I also computed marginal effects from Model 4 in Table 9 . Figure 5 presents the predictive margins of bank contributions on the probability of voting for the bill. These estimates suggest large effects. According to the figure, there is a 58% chance that a Democrat will vote "yes" on the bill when getting a zero share of contributions from money-center banks.
However, a Democrat that gets 1 percent of his total contributions from banks is 38 percentage points less likely to favor the bill, with a predicted probability of voting "yes" of just 20%.
Contributions from big banks seem to have large effects even when they comprise relatively small shares of representatives' total receipts.
The same holds for member ideology. According to Figure 6 , moving DW-NOMINATE from the value of the most left-wing Democrat (Jim McDermott, WA-7) to the value of the most right-wing Democrat (Heath Shuler NC-11) increases the odds of voting "yes" on the bill by 67 percentage points. Ideology thus appears to have a large effect on voting to make the Fed more transparent. Note, however, that the direction of this effect is the reserve of traditional coalition patterns. The Right is now challenging the Fed to be more transparent, more accountable, and less beholden to banks while the Left is positioning itself as the defender of the Fed. I consider this historic reversal in the conclusion.
Conclusion
The Dodd-Frank law combined with a Supreme Court ruling to force the Federal Reserve to disclose nearly all borrower-specific information about its last-resort lending during the crisis.
The disclosures revealed that the Fed had provided vast amounts of dollar liquidity to foreign banks and central banks-a consequence of the rapid globalization of banking after 1999 that left many foreign banks highly exposed to disruptions in short-term dollar funding markets. Had the Fed not supported foreign banks, the credit crisis in the U.S. would almost certainly have been worse. In a broader sense, the disclosures revealed that the Federal Reserve had become-by default-the lender of last resort to the world's global banks.
At the time they were making crisis decisions, Federal Reserve officials did not know they would have to reveal this borrower-specific information. In this paper, I utilized this exogeneity for two purposes. First, I used data from the disclosures to evaluate cross-country variation in the Fed's foreign lending. I created two measures of this outcome: (1) an indicator variable for the 14 central bank jurisdictions the Fed selected for dollar swap lines, and (2) country shares of the Fed's total peak foreign lending from all other facilities. I regressed each variable on set of economic and financial variables that proxy for the Fed's selection criteria (as revealed by the disclosures), plus a political-economy variable that captures the interests of U.S.
money-center banks: their exposure in a foreign market as a share of their total foreign exposure.
While I found some support for the Fed's selection criteria, the factor that most strongly and consistently "predicts" the Fed's foreign lending is the extent to which large U.S. banks have financial claims on a country.
It is perhaps impolitic for the Fed to acknowledge the role that money-center banks The financial crisis downgraded monetary policy to a second-order concern for the Fed, which concentrated on restoring stability to the increasingly globalized financial sector. This shift in focus left the Fed vulnerable to attacks from the right of the political spectrum, where people tend to see financial instability as caused by excessive government intervention in the economy. From this perspective, the Fed's emergency loans were "bailouts" that created the moral hazard that caused banks to take on too much risk in the first place.
In addition, the disclosures revealed the Fed to be an agency committed to global financial stability, which touched another nerve on the Right. Details of the Fed's support for foreign banks and central banks antagonized right-wing legislators, who are known to oppose organizations like the IMF that backstop the international financial system (Broz 2011, Broz Notes: OLS regressions where the dependent variable is peak lending by the Federal Reserve to the banks and non-banks of a foreign country as a share of the Fed's total peak lending to all foreign banks and non-banks during the financial crisis (see the text for details). Notes: After 1999, foreign banks, particularly in Europe, began investing heavily in U.S. subprime assets via the shadow banking system. They funded these asset purchases by borrowing dollars in U.S. wholesale markets, particularly from U.S. money market funds. When these wholesale funding markets froze up in October 2008 after the Lehmann failure, foreign banks could not roll-over their short-term dollar liabilities. In response to this dollar liquidity crisis, the Federal Reserve served as global lender-of-last-resort, creating liquidity to meet the (largely foreign) demand for U.S. dollars. Table 7 , holding covariates to their means (or mode = 0 for Global Financial Center), while increasing U.S. BANK EXPOSURE from its minimum to its maximum value. Table 9 . . 
